Abstract-In the smart grid, an integrated distributed authentication protocol is needed to not only securely manage the system but also efficiently authenticate many different entities for the communications. In addition, a lightweight authentication protocol is required to handle frequent authentications among billions of devices. Unfortunately, in the literature, there is no such integrated protocol that provides mutual authentication among the home environment, energy provider, gateways, and advanced metering infrastructure network. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a lightweight cloud-trusted authorities-based integrated (centrally controlled) distributed authentication protocol that provides mutual authentications among communicated entities in a distributed manner. Based on certificateless cryptosystem, our protocol is lightweight and efficient even when there are invalid requests in a batch. Security and performance analysis show that the protocol provides privacy preservation, forward secrecy, semantic security, perfect key ambiguous, and protection against identity thefts while generating lower overheads in comparison with the existing protocols. Also, the protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks, redirection attacks, impersonation attacks, and denial-of-service attacks. Moreover, our protocol provides a complete resistance against flood-based denial-of-service attacks.
technologies, such as global system for mobile communication (GSM) and long term evolution (LTE) [2] . SMs are equipped with two communication interfaces, where one interface works as a SM and other works as a HAN-GW. Therefore, the SM is a central home controller that communicates with all HA within a household. Further, the BAN-GW/NAN-GW acts as (or deploy) an aggregator (AG) that receives data from the SM and forwards it to the respective control center (CC) via relays and concentrators with wired/wireless connections. Fig. 1 shows the overall architecture of the SG system.
A. Motivation and Research Problem
Two-way communications in the SG enable instant interaction between different SG entities and help to improve the overall efficiency of the SG system. According to the NIST report [3] , one of the main security issues in the SG system is that existing authentication mechanisms do not sufficiently authenticate devices or exposes authentication keys. Without proper authentications, the system resources and entities can be compromised that may result in financial losses and performance degradation [4] . Centrally control authentication in a decentralized environment is required for the centralized security management in terms of event logging/analysis and authentication [8] , [9] . A fast and lightweight protocol is needed to support frequent authentications repeated many times among billions of devices. In sum, an integrated, distributed, fast, and lightweight authentication protocol will provide mutual authentication 1937-9234 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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between the various entities of the SG system. An integrated distributed protocol can help to maximize the utilization of shared resources with low overhead. Furthermore, the security protocol of the SG system must defend against known security attacks, including man-in-the-middle (MITM) and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [5] .
In the subsequent parts of this section, we first discuss about limitations and concerns of the existing protocols for command and control information delivery. We also highlight the standardized protocols supporting authentication process along with their limitations of not suitable for the SG system. Also, we raise a point of user data privacy, which is not covered and maintained by the existing protocols.
There are many different communication protocols used for delivering commands and control information. However, these protocols were not initially designed with security in mind. Today, when Internet is connected to the SG system, various organizations, such as ETSI, IEEE, and NIST are embedding security to the existing protocols as new standards in order to prevent the system against well-known security attacks. However, they need to modify many communication standards to make them security embedded. This creates additional overheads. Furthermore, researchers have not yet focused much on an integrated protocol, rather they have proposed separate protocols for individual connections between different entities in the SG. They have not discussed the integration of these protocols for compatible communication among them. This motivates us to propose such an efficient and secure authentication protocol for the SG system.
There are some standardized protocols available for the SG that support authentication process, such as open smart grid protocol (OSGP) for the SMs, distributed network protocol (DNP3) between the CC and the substations, device language message specification/companion specification for energy metering (DLMS/COSEM) for the AMI network, and OpenADR for the demand response program. In addition, other standardized authentication protocols also exist, such as remote authentication dial-in user service (RADIUS) and Diameter protocols for the 2G, 3G, and 4G cellular networks [11] .
The OSGP protocol was deployed for providing the authentication and confidential security to the SG applications. This protocol is expected to provide reliable and efficient delivery of command and control information between the SMs, direct load control modules, GWs, and other SG devices. However, recently, researchers from Germany recovered private encryption keys of the SMs in a system following OSGP without a significant computational effort [12] . Also, a number of attacks has been performed over the OSGP protocol [6] , including one with just 13 queries to a homegrown message authentication code (OMA digest) oracle, and by which the protocol further failed to deliver authenticity guarantee and confidentiality (due to using a nonstandard composition of RC4 as weak encryption algorithm) [12] . Similar security issues were found in the DNP3 protocol, which does not provide authentication, message integrity, and confidentiality. In 2012, a new version of the DNP3 protocol, named DNP3 secure authentication version 5 was announced, which provides methods to remotely change user update keys using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography [13] . However, DNP3 secure authentication considers only spoofing, modification, and replay attacks over the network, and does not provide confidentiality of the message. Also, version 5 of the protocol is not backward compatible with previous versions, which may add a heavy protocol replacement cost.
Furthermore, the authentication provided by DLMS/COSEM, OpenADR, RADIUS, and Diameter are not sufficient, and also OpenADR is costly [11] . The DLMS (application layer communication protocol) and COSEM (data model) together provide an interface model for metering applications [14] . However, DLMS/COSEM's security services are restricted to use symmetric key encryption. In practice, SMs need asymmetric key to be used in secure socket layer/transport layer security (TLS/SSL), but DLMS/COSEM does not support TLS/SSL. In demand response, OpenADR, which is a standard development effort, supports authentication based on public key cryptography with exchange of certificates [15] . This standard maintains a hierarchy of certified authorities and requires a PKI to use three-tier PKI, which ultimately results in high development cost.
RADIUS is commonly used protocol to provide centralized remote user authentication and accounting in cellular networks, and WLAN interworking and Wi-Fi offload situations [16] . However, the SG requires decentralized solutions, as a singlepoint-of-failure can massively affect the centralized system. RADIUS implementation supports peer authentication between communication endpoints using a pre-shared key, which brings key management issues and is not suitable for large systems, such as SG. Furthermore, RADIUS has poor scalability and uses the user datagram protocol (UDP), which does not provide reliable data transfer. Therefore, RADIUS is not suitable for the SG where the availability of information is extremely important. On the other hand, Diameter protocol is an authentication, authorization, and accounting protocol used in networking, which supports transmission control protocol (TCP) instead of UDP. However, its supported capabilities are sometimes more expansive when a large number of entities are involved. Furthermore, RADIUS and Diameter protocols do not directly protect against DoS attacks carried out by flooding the target equipment with bogus traffic.
There are several challenges with the current authentication protocols in terms of efficiency, overhead, cost, delay, and privacy. Also, many vulnerabilities do exist in the available authentication schemes of various communication protocols, such as weak encryption and message digest in the OSGP protocol [6] , security issues in the DNP3 protocol [7] (even in version 5 [13] ), etc. There is not yet an integrated distributed authentication protocol that provides mutual authentication between the home environment (HA, SM, HAN-GW), EP, GWs (BAN-GW, NAN-GW), and the AMI network (SM, AG/collector, CC). An integrated protocol can provide a common platform for authenticating various devices while efficiently maximizing the utilization of shared resources with low overhead in the SG system. Also, the privacy protection in the SG system is an important requirement, so the protocol must not reveal the confidential and private information related to any entity involved in the authentication process. Therefore, an end user (consumer) should have a control over his/her own home environment, such as HA, since data generated and being sent belong to a particular user. Furthermore, the protocol must be fast and efficient, and should be able to defeat known security attacks.
B. Protocol Design Challenges
There are several challenges in designing a centrally controlled integrated distributed authentication protocol as we identified below.
1) The protocol should not only be controlled by a central entity, but also by the subsystems of the SG network in a distributed manner. 2) Embedding security solutions in each communication protocol of the SG network is not only highly complex but also generates huge overhead and cost. Therefore, it would be more flexible and efficient to instead design a cybersecurity layer over the communication network to maintain end-to-end security [10] . This simplifies the integration at the cyber-security layer by avoiding complex integration of different communication protocols in the SG network.
3) The protocol should be able to utilize the available system resources efficiently. 4) The generated overhead by the protocol should be as low as possible. The protocol should be fast and lightweight, as authentication process is frequently repeated many times among billions of devices, especially, when devices receive multiple messages at once, such as when GWs authenticate multiple SMs and gather data from them. 5) The protocol must utilize suitable cryptosystem (with symmetric and/or asymmetric keys) as recommended by standard organizations, such as IEEE, ETSI, and NIST. Particularly, NIST report [8] emphasizes the issues of key exchange in symmetric key cryptography and the public key infrastructure (PKI) in asymmetric key cryptography. Hence, key management issue must be considered in design. 6) The protocol should enable consumers to have security control over his/her home, i.e., control over all HAs with the SM. 7) The protocol must support secure communications over the network with strong encryption. Moreover, the identity of each device should be protected over the network to maintain identity anonymity and untraceability. 8) The protocol must be able to defeat various well-known security attacks, such as MITM attacks, redirection attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and floodbased DoS attacks.
C. Our Contribution
In this paper, we design an integrated distributed protocol for the SG network, which meets all the aforementioned challenges. Note that the proposed protocol may not be suitable for some parts of the SG system with very low communication latency requirements, such as for the generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE) and sampled measured values (SMV) layer-2 messages within the substation. Here, messages are not encrypted due to the transmission requirements within 4 ms. In such scenarios, a virtual LAN with layer-2 capabilities can be used with signed authenticated values [17] 
D. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses related work, and Section III presents our SG system model. A new authentication protocol is proposed in Section IV. Security and performance analysis is presented in Section V, including a formal proof of the protocol. Section VI presents the conclusion of this paper. Table I summarizes different symbols and abbreviations used in the paper along with their descriptions and sizes. Note that the sizes of public and private keys depend on the algorithm used in asymmetric encryption.
II. RELATED WORK
We first discuss the existing authentication protocols that provide authentications between various entities with lower overhead, and then those that provide protection against security attacks and preserves the privacy over the SG network.
For providing low overheads, a lightweight authentication scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) was proposed in [1] . However, it provides mutual authentication only between the HAN-GW and the BAN-GW. Sule et al. [18] made a change in [1] by using an MAC between the AMI devices and the controller nodes instead of HMAC. Although this scheme reduces the verification time, it also reduces the protocol security provided by the function. As in [1] , the scheme only involves the HAN-GW and the BAN-GW communication. Further, an authentication scheme using a batch signature verification was proposed in [19] . However, the scheme does not focus on authentication among SM, HAN, and HA, rather authenticating data aggregation. A key agreement protocol for the SG is proposed in [20] , which reduces the number of hash functions used and the delay caused by the security process. Recently, an identity-based scheme is proposed to provide authentication between the SM and the AS, and reduces the total number of exchanged packets, but increases the CPO [21] . Many researchers have proposed solutions in order to resist against different attacks in the SG system, such as replay, MITM, impersonation, and DoS. However, in the absence of authentication, an attacker can easily tamper the message and/or can send a fabricated message. In this direction, a mutual authentication scheme between the SM and the data concentration unit (DCU) was proposed to prevent impersonation and MITM attacks [22] . However, this scheme neither discusses the generated overhead nor provides authentication in a home environment. Recently, an authentication scheme using a Merkle hash tree technique was proposed to prevent replay, injection, and message modification attacks [23] . However, communication only between the HAN and the NAN is considered. A Diffie-Hellman-based secure aggregation scheme for collecting data was presented in [24] , which generates lower CPO and CMO, but the scheme does not consider SM's authentication. Kursawe et al. [25] stated that a strong authentication technique is required for all users and devices within the SG network. It is expected that in the near future, due to the increase in the number of devices, the current protocols may not be scalable.
In addition, the privacy of the customers in terms of power usage, billing, and other information must be preserved during the authentication. In this direction, an identity-based authentication protocol is proposed to provide source authentication, data integrity, nonrepudiation services, and privacy preservation in AMI [26] . However, the protocol does not consider overhead and efficiency. Yan et al. [27] proposed an integrated authentication and confidentiality protocol that provides a mutual authentication between the SM and the AMI network, and enables data privacy, integrity, and confidentiality. However, the protocol generates a large overhead as it performs several encryption/decryption operations. Further, it does not consider EP and HA entities in the authentication system. In summary, several standard, lightweight, and privacypreserved protocols have been proposed by researchers. However, the existing standard protocols do not provide sufficient security and privacy preservation to the SG system. Also, many existing protocols (including privacy-preserved) are inefficient and generate large overheads. Furthermore, the existing lightweight and privacy-preserved protocols are with limited capability of authenticating only few entities (mostly two devices) in the SG. In other words, these protocols do not enable authentication among all entities with optimized resource utilization. Moreover, embedding security to the existing protocols generates large overheads and requires integration to authenticate all entities of the SG network, which results in inefficient and costly solutions. Therefore, there is a need of an integrated lightweight authentication protocol that provides mutual authentication from end-to-end, protects the SG system from known attacks, and keeps the privacy preserved. We tackle this problem in this paper.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In the SG system, security operations are usually assumed to be done independently by individual center. However, due to limited processing capability, these centers do not support online analysis and generate high maintenance cost [28] . Further, the SG requires a powerful platform with effective integration and ubiquitous seamless access to collect and analyze large data collected from a variety of sources, such as AMI, wide area measurement system (WAMS), and HA. Recent studies [29] - [32] show that cloud computing is very much compatible with the SG system because of its several advantages, including energy efficiency, flexibility, scalability, agility, and cost effectiveness. Various researchers have proposed their solutions by integrating cloud computing in the SG system. Baek et al. [30] designed a big data information management framework, called Smart-Frame, based on a cloud computing model. Also, Jiang et al. [33] proposed a scheme for searchable encryption on the cloud database in the SG, and Bitzer and Gebretsadik [34] presented a feasibility study of monitoring renewable energy in the SG based on a cloud computing framework retaining SG security. Developing a secure cloud network is not our goal in this paper. However, we consider that our scheme uses secure cloud servers as discussed in [30] , [33] , and [34] . We employ the cloud computing into our SG system, particularly [30] , which builds a hierarchical structure of cloud computing centers. Employing cloud computing in the SG not only addresses the issue of large information management, but also provides a high energy and cost saving platform. A roadmap in [35] presents a realistic example of deploying cloud computing centers in the SG system.
We propose to have a cyber-security layer on the top of communication layer that takes care of the security issues existing in the communication between any two entities over the network. Our SG system is divided into several regions/areas, each of which is managed by either a public or private, but secure cloud computing center [30] . As shown in Fig. 2 , we consider three different tiers in our SG system as follows:
1) Tier-1: Central cloud computing center; 2) Tier-2: Distributed cloud computing centers; 3) Tier-3: SMs, GWs, and EPs. As shown in Fig. 2 , there are n distributed cloud computing centers, also called trusted authorities (TAs). Each TA manages a region that includes various SMs, GWs, and EPs. The tier-1 TA provides inter-TA communication among different entities within the system, while the tier-2 TAs are responsible for managing the public key repository, and generating partial public and private keys of devices at their ends. The main purpose of enabling cloud environment in our SG system is to provide an easy and fast access to the public key repository and to efficiently generate public and private key pairs. In addition, the SG requires a powerful computing platform to handle a large-scale data analysis and to support complex real-time application services. In each TA, various cloud computing services can be deployed, such as infrastructure-as-a-service for SG information collection, processing and storage, platform-as-a-service for developing and integrating cloud computing specific security-based applications for the SG environment, and software-as-a-service for specific services, such as optimization of energy usage.
IV. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
This section proposes an authentication protocol for the SG system. We first present an overview of our protocol, then present mutual authentication approaches between different SG entities. The authentication between EP-SM, SM-GW, and SM-HA are based on asymmetric key cryptography, asymmetric key cryptography in batch, and symmetric key cryptography, respectively.
A. Overview
Recently, identity-based cryptography (IBC) is considered suitable for securing grid and cloud computing environments [36] , [37] . However, IBC suffers from the key escrow problem [38] . Our protocol is based on a certificateless cryptosystem, which is a combination of identity-based cryptography and traditional public key cryptography [39] . Our approach not only overcomes the key escrow problem in IBC, but also does not require traditional PKI that is costly due to the private key generation. We instead use a key generation center (KGC). The security of our scheme is based on the security of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for the group of points over the finite field. Here, we let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field F p as E : [40] . The identity (ID) of each device (EP, SM, GW, HA) in the SG network is taken from a random point on elliptic curve over E(F q ).
Each TA generates its private and public key pair, known as a master private key and a master public key, and makes the public key available to its users. Our approach is simpler than the Diffie-Hellman protocol, as it uses one-way hash functions instead of exponential functions. The KGC (at each TA) supplies an entity with a partial private key (PPR) and a partial public key (PPU). We assume that KGC securely delivers the partial keys to the intended entities. Each entity then combines its partial public and private keys with secret information to generate its actual private and public keys. In this way, the entity's private key is not known to the KGC and the anonymity of the user's public key is also achieved. This anonymity is useful when we consider that in order to receive the public key of a device, the requested device must be verified authentic to the TA using its partial key credentials.
First, we present generic definitions of the algorithms used in our scheme, and then explain each of these algorithms in detail.
Definition 1: A generic certificateless public key encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms. 
7)
Decrypt: The ciphertext C is decrypted using param and PRK to retrieve the plaintext M as M = Decrypt(param, PRK, C). The public key of each entity is available in a public repository of the corresponding tier-2 cloud computing center (TA). The private keys are kept secret and stored on the SMs, the GWs, and the EPs. Since each entity is registered to a specific TA, it knows the identity and the public key of the TA. The details of generating different keys are as follows.
q is a random integer with large prime q, and P is a generator of a large cyclic group G over E(F q ). Each TA generates its private and public key pair as (PRK TA = t, PUK TA = tP ) . Let us define the hash functions used in this protocol as
2) PartialKeyGeneration: TA chooses a random s ∈ Z * q , and computes w = sP and x = s + PRK TA H 1 (ID). Note that ID is first converted from an elliptic curve point to a bit string [41] in H 1 () and then is hashed. Returns (PPU, PPR) = (w, x). 
B. Authentication Between the EP and the SM
We assume that EP knows the identity of each SM that it supplies the electricity to. Similarly, each SM also knows the identity of its EP, as it has a contract with the EP. As shown in Fig. 3 , the authentication between the EP and the SM/HAN-GW is carried out as follows: Step-1 EP→SM:
First, the EP retrieves the public key of the SM from the repository stored at its tier-2, i.e., PUK SM . Then, the EP encrypts its identity ID EP , a nonce K 1 , and the location (Zip code) Zip EP with the public key of the SM and sends it to the SM along with a current timestamp T 1 and an MAC 1 (message-1), where
. We consider each MAC as a HMAC function, i.e., HMACSHA256, that uses a pre-assigned key, say K.
Step-2 SM→EP: 1 . If it is verified, the SM decrypts the message using its private key. Then, the SM retrieves the public key of the EP (PUK EP ) and verifies the identity and the location of the EP. If it is verified, the SM sends (ID SM , K 2 , Zip SM ) encrypted with PUK EP to the EP along with T 2 and MAC 2 (message-2), where
Step-3: On receiving message-2, the EP computes MAC 2 and checks if MAC 2 ? =MAC 2 . If it is verified, the EP decrypts the received message using its private key, and verifies the identity and the location of the SM. If both are correct, the EP computes a shared secret key as SK 1 
and sends message to the SM encrypted with this shared key. Here, H 3 () is a one-way hash function. Similarly, the SM also computes the same secret SK 1 key.
C. Authentication Between the SM and the GW
We assume that a group of SMs sends its metering data to a specific GW. The GW keeps a record of the identity of each SM associated with it. A number of SMs communicates with a GW simultaneously, so the authentication process is executed in a batch. The authentication process and the communication scenario of the proposed authentication scheme between a group of SMs and the GW are shown in Figs. 4 and 5, respectively. As shown in Fig. 4 , the authentication process is carried out as follows:
Step-1 SM i →GW:
First, each SM i retrieves the identity and the public key of the GW. Then, each SM i sends its identity and Z i encrypted with PUK GW along with its current timestamp T 3 i and MAC 3 i to the GW (message-1), where
are the random secret values selected by each SM i . 
Step-2 GW→SM i : [E PUK S M i {ID GW , e}, T 4 i , MAC 4 i ]:
On receiving message-1, the GW computes MAC 3 i and checks message integrity. If it is verified, the GW compares its current timestamp t m with T threshold = T 3 i + , where is the maximum allowed delay to transmit the message to the GW. If t m > T threshold , the request is discarded and the connection is terminated. Otherwise, the GW decrypts the message using its private key, and verifies the identity of the SM i . If it is verified, the GW checks the number of attempts by the SM i within a specified interval. If it is more than the assigned limit, the connection is terminated. Otherwise, the GW sends its identity and a value e encrypted using the public key of the corresponding SM i along with T 4 i and MAC 4 i (message-2) to the SM i . Here, e = h(Z), h is a one-way hash function, Z = n i=1 Z i , and n is the number of SM i communicating with the GW.
Step-3 SM i →GW:
On receiving message-2, each SM i computes MAC 4 i and verifies the integrity of each message. If it is verified, SM i decrypts the messages using private keys PRK SM i , and verifies the received identity of the GW. If it is verified, each SM i stores e, and generates a variable
Note that the first 128 bits of P PRK S M i are used in P SM i and S SM i for operations' compatibility. Then, each SM i sends ID SM i , P SM i , and S SM i encrypted using public key of the GW along with T 5 i and -3) to the GW. On receiving message-3, the GW computes MAC 5 i and checks message integrity. If it is verified, the GW decrypts the messages, and verifies the identity of each SM i . In a scenario where a group of SM i communicates with a GW, adversary may possibly compromise some of the SM i to perform flood-based DoS attacks. The compromised SM i can flood the victim GW with fake message-3 by spoofing meters' identities. Adversary can even send an empty or a random message to the GW. This leads to half-open authentication requests at the GW.
Step-2 of this protocol addresses such issues. In order to prevent these attacks, the identity and signature of each SM i is verified. For each unresponsive SM i , the GW removes the corresponding Z i and re-computes Z. Then, the GW computes P = Therefore, our scheme is efficient even with the presence of invalid requests in a batch since the GW only needs to recompute Z, which is simply a summation of all Z i .
D. Authentication Between the HA and the SM
Since data generated and sent by all HAs belong to a particular user, we involve the end user (owner) for authenticating the HAs (at the initial setup) [42] . The energy consumption information can reveal personal details of the consumers, such as their daily routines (including times when they are at home or asleep), what electronic equipment they own and are being used, etc. Consumers expect that the privacy of this information is maintained. We assume that the SM and all HAs share a password selected by the user. A secret key SK 2 = H 3 (pwd, T ) is generated each time a HA and the SM communicates, where pwd is the shared password, T is a timestamp, and H 3 is a one-way hash function. As shown in Fig. 6 , the authentication process between the HA and the SM is carried out as follows:
Step-1 HA→SM: [T ID HA , T 6 , MAC 6 ]: First, each HA generates SK 2 from a shared password and uses it to encrypt the original identity of the HA. Then, it sends a temporary identity TID HA , a timestamp T 6 , and MAC 6 to the SM (message-1), where MAC 6 = [T ID HA , T 6 ] and SK 2 = H 3 (pwd, T 6 ). The encryption can be performed by any standard symmetric key algorithm, such as AES-CTR or MAES-CTR [43] .
Step-2 SM→HA:
On receiving message-1, the SM verifies MAC 6 with the received MAC 6 . If it is verified, the SM decrypts and recovers the actual identity of the HA. If the identity belongs to one of its HA, it generates a temporary identity TID SM and sends its identity to the HA along with T 7 and MAC 7 (message-2), where
On receiving message-2, the HA computes MAC 7 and compares it with MAC 7 , and further decrypts and recovers the actual identity of the SM. If it is correct, the HA and the SM can start communicating using messages encrypted by SK 2 . Moreover, the password can be automatically changed at a regular interval by calculating
where N is the number of days, d is a random secret, and H 3 change () is a hash function. For the password change, the user needs to provide N to the SM. When, a new password is generated at SM, the SM encrypts the password using last session key and sends it to all the HAS before discarding the previous key.
E. Authentication Between the NAN-GW and the CC
We assume that the NAN-GW aggregates the received data from different SMs. The CC is assumed to be connected to the NAN-GW using wired network and is authenticated. In case, if it is wireless connected, the scenario similar to EP-SM provides mutual authentication.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section presents the verification proofs, defenses against security attacks, and security and performance analysis of our protocol in comparison with the existing lightweight protocols.
A. Verification Proof
We present the verification proofs for public decryption of our public encryption scheme, and the correctness of the protocol between SMs and their corresponding GW. 
1) Verification of Decryption in Our Encryption Scheme:
V er 1 = c 3 − xP = w + u − xP = sP + P UK TA H 1 (ID) − [s + P RK TA H 1 (ID)]P = sP + P RK TA H 1 (ID)P − sP − P RK TA H 1 (ID)P = 0. V er 2 = H 2 (M ||γ)P ? = c 1 = H 2 (M ||γ)P ? = rP = H 2 (M ||γ)P ? = H 2 (M ||γ)P.
2) Correctness of the Protocol Between
SM i -GW: L.H.S. = Z = n i=1 Z i = ID SM 1 K 1 + ID SM 2 K 2 + · · · + ID SM n K n . R.H.S. = R − eP = (S SM 1 ID SM 1 + S SM 2 ID SM 2 + · · · + S SM n ID SM n ) − e(P SM 1 + P SM 2 + · · · + P SM n ) = ((K 1 + e(P RK SM 1 ))ID SM 1 + (K 2 + e (P RK SM 2 ))ID SM 2 + · · · + (K n + e(P RK SM n )) ID SM n ) − e(P SM 1 +P SM 2 + · · · +P SM n ) = (ID SM 1 K 1 + ID SM 2 K 2 + · · · + ID SM n K n ) + e ((P RK SM 1 )ID SM 1 + (P RK SM 2 )ID SM 2 + · · · + (P RK SM n )ID SM n ) − e(P SM 1 + P SM 2 + · · · + P SM n ) = (ID SM 1 K 1 + ID SM 2 K 2 + · · · + ID SM n K n ) + e (P SM 1 + P SM 2 + · · · + P SM n ) − e(P SM 1 + P SM 2 + · · · + P SM n ) = ID SM 1 K 1 + ID SM 2 K 2 + · · · + ID SM n K n = Z.
B. Defenses Against Security Attacks
We assume that an adversary A has a complete knowledge about the system topology, as well as the identities and public keys of the entities. A may be an internal entity or an external entity. A may attempt to launch MITM attacks on the active connections between any two entities of the SG network. Since all messages over the network are encrypted, inherently, MITM attacks will not be successful to modify the transmitted information. Replay attacks are also prevented as each message over the network contains a unique timestamp value. As discussed in Section IV-C, the proposed protocol also defeats flood-based DoS attacks. In addition, impersonation attacks are prevented, since the fake request is discarded and the connection is terminated. A does not have the actual private key/shared secret key of the valid entity and therefore cannot decrypt the transmitted message. The key size of each shared secret key and public key/private key is chosen to be longer than 128 bits to resist against brute-force attacks. Furthermore, the Zip codes sent by the devices are used to overcome redirection attacks. Table II shows a comparison of the security capabilities of the proposed protocol with the existing protocols. Note that [20] and [21] partially protect DoS attacks by simply limiting the key agreement sessions.
C. Security Analysis
The proposed protocol provides mutual authentication between the EP and the SM, between the SM and the GW, and between the SM and the HA. Our protocol also provides a perfect forward secrecy, since the adversary A can neither retrieve the actual key nor predict any of the future keys using a shared secret key. Furthermore, our protocol preserves the privacy of communicated entities over the network and overcomes ID thefts, as the transmitted messages are always encrypted. Table III shows a comparison of security requirements. Note that we have a system with |K| = |C| = |P |, each of 128 bits (with AES-CTR) or 256 bits (with MAES-CTR) for symmetric encryption and |K| ≥ |C| = |P | for asymmetric encryption. Therefore, our system has perfect secrecy as each key is used with equal probability 1/|K|, and for each plaintext P and ciphertext C, there is a unique key K such that E K (P) = C. As well, our system with at least equal size spaces |P |=|C|=|K| is perfectly key ambiguous as the keys are picked uniformly, and for all x ∈ P , y ∈ C, there is a unique key K such that y = E K (x).
Furthermore, A cannot retrieve the partial and actual private keys of any device. Even in other scenarios where A extracts any one of these parameters 1) PPR, 2) PPU, and 3) public key, or replaces the public key of the device, our public encryption scheme is able to defend such attacks as A cannot retrieve the actual private key and cannot decrypt the message. Let us consider two scenarios in which A tries to extract some information.
Scenario-1: A does not have access to the masterKey, but may replace public keys (PUK) of the devices with any value, and also requests the public key of victim device, extracts the PPR, and makes decryption queries. Under this scenario, A has following restrictions:
1) A cannot extract the PPR of the challenge device ID at any point, as the fake ID will be discarded by the TA; 2) A cannot request the private key (PRK) of any identity, if the respective public key (PUK) has been replaced; 3) A cannot make a decryption query on the challenge ciphertext C that was generated by a combination of (ID, PUK). Scenario-2: A does have access to the masterKey, but may not replace public keys (PUK) of the devices. A can compute PPR of any device, and also can request public key and make private key extraction and decryption queries. Under this scenario, A has following restrictions: 1) A cannot replace the public key (PUK) of any device at any time, as the identity and public key repositories are stored at various TA; 2) A cannot extract the private key (PRK) of the challenge device at any time, as it is randomly selected by each device; 3) A cannot successfully decrypt the challenge ciphertext C on behalf of the victim device, as it may generate PPR of the device, but does not have the actual private key (PRK) of the device. Definition 2: A protocol is secure against adaptive chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) for symmetric and asymmetric key cryptosystems, respectively, if no polynomial bounded adversary has a nonnegligible advantage. Therefore, our protocol is secure against IND-CPA and IND-CCA.
Our system is secure in terms of indistinguishability as A cannot identify the message choice because of a unique combination of P and K for each transmitted message C. Here, Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) is equivalent to the property of semantic security. In our protocol, symmetric encryption is performed by AES-CTR, which is IND-CPA secure. Also, the asymmetric encryption, performed by the proposed scheme, is based on ECC and is indistinguishable under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) considering hardness of the ECDLP [44] . 
D. Performance Analysis
A mutual authentication between the HAN-GW and the BAN-GW is proposed in [1] , and a mutual authentication between the SM and the AS of the DCU-GW is proposed in [21] . A number of authentication scenarios between SM, HAN-GW, BAN-GW, NAN-GW, and HA are presented in [20] , whereas our protocol proposes mutual authentication between EP, SM, HAN-GW, BAN-GW, NAN-GW, and HA. This section computes and compares CMO and CPO among these four protocols, and evaluates total execution time of the proposed protocol.
The total CMO and the total CPO of the protocol for a single authentication token are calculated, respectively, as CMO total = CMO EP-SM + CMO SM -GW + CMO SM -HA and CPO total = CPO EP-SM + CPO SM -GW + CPO SM -HA + CPO key-gen . Table IV shows a comparison of the CMO and CPO of our protocol with the existing protocols [1] , [20] , [21] . Out of these three existing protocols, it is fair to compare our protocol with only the protocol in [20] , as only this protocol includes most of the involved entities in the SG, while only two entities are involved in [1] and [21] . Although, the protocol in [20] and our protocol cover a similar range of entities, our protocol achieves much lower overhead. In detail, authentication scenario between the EP-SM generates CMO of 1024 bits and prevents MITM, replay, impersonation, and redirection attacks. The scenario between the SM-GW generates 1216 bits of CMO and prevents MITM, replay, impersonation, repudiation, and flood-based DoS attacks. In comparison with the protocol in [1] , our protocol is also resistant against flood-based DoS attacks while adding just 24 bits of CMO. Furthermore, in the authentication scenario between the SM-HA, our protocol prevents MITM, replay, impersonation, and brute-force attacks while generating 512 bits of CMO.
We also evaluate the performance of our protocol when there are multiple authentication tokens. We assume that there are m users executing the protocol simultaneously and each user has n HAs. The CMO generated by the proposed protocol is calculated
The CPO generated by the proposed protocol is calculated as CP O(m, n) = (5 m + 2n)E + (5m + 2n)D + (3m + n + 1)H + (10m + 4n)MAC + 1ESUB + 4mEMUL + 1MUL + mADD + (2m-2)EADD + 4mXOR. Here, E and D represent encryption and decryption, respectively, XOR is bit-wise exclusive-OR, MUL and ADD are scalar multiplication and addition over integers/binaries, respectively, EMUL, EADD, and ESUB are elliptic curve multiplication, addition and subtraction (all three are computed as additions), respectively, and H and MAC are hash and authentication code functions, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that there are r malicious users in a batch. The protocol first removes invalid requests of the malicious users and then computes other parameters before further executing the protocol. In such case, the total recalculated CPO 
E. Simulation Result
We simulated the protocol in Java environment with JDK1.7, Intel Core i3-4500U CPU 1.7 GHz, 2GB RAM, and Windows7 OS. For a single authentication token, the scalar addition and multiplication operations over integer/binaries took 0.000933 and 0.00918 ms, single addition and doubling over elliptic curve took 0.6031 and 0.6047 ms, hash function SHA256 took 0.9 ms, HMAC function HMACSHA256 took 271.60 ms, and encryption and decryption times of symmetric MAES-CTR mode with 256 bits key between EP-SM and SM-HA took 0.97 and 0.78 ms, respectively. Moreover, the asymmetric encryption 1) using RSA with 2048 bits key and 2) using certificateless public encryption scheme took (30, 16) ms and (12, 7.6) ms, respectively. The total computation time by our protocol using RSA and using proposed scheme is 4041.91 and 3962.71 ms, respectively. This computation time can be further reduced by using the fast multiplication, where a single addition and doubling take approximately half of the ordinary ECC multiplication, i.e., 0.303 ms [45] . The total messages (2752 bits) transmission times on 3G and 4G networks [46] by our protocol are 0.000451 and 0.000182 ms, respectively. Hence, the total execution time by our protocol (with certificateless cipher scheme) on 3G and 4G networks of approximately 3.96 s is quite reasonable, considering that it is the total time for completing authentication for all involved entities in the SG network. Here, we presented just one case for the overall protocol execution time. However, if we encrypt the message with AES-CTR/MAES-CTR for symmetric encryption, and the symmetric key is encrypted by an asymmetric algorithm, the overall time can be further reduced.
Keys generation of different entities are considered as a preexecution phase, as all keys are generated before the protocol run starts. The key generation time varies with the generated random numbers and elliptic curve addition and doubling operations in our scheme. Let a represent the number of operations for elliptic curve addition and doubling points, and let b represent the number of devices deployed in the network. A random number generation takes 0.69 ms. Then, the generation time for the private and public master keys, i.e., PRK TA and PUK TA are 0.69 and 0.60a ms, respectively. The total generation times for private keys (z, x) and public keys (w, v) are (0.69, 0.01)b ms and (0.60a, 0.60a)b ms, respectively. Therefore, total key generation time of our scheme is 0.69 + 0.60 a + b(0.70 + 1.20a) ms.
F. Formal Proof of the Properties of the Protocol
In order to justify our analysis, we use the BAN-Logic to provide a formal proof of our scheme. The notations used in BAN-Logic can be referred from [47] .
1) Message Meaning Rule: 1) Rule shown at the bottom of the page.
2) Rule shown at the bottom of the page.
2) Timestamp Verification Rule:
3) Jurisdiction Rule: 
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed protocol, based on hierarchical cloud TAs, provides mutual authentication between the EP and the SM, between the SM/HAN-GW and the BAN-GW/NAN-GW, between the SM and the HA, and between the NAN-GW and the CC. Particularly, the authentications between EP-SM and GW-CC, SM-GW, and SM-HA are, respectively, based on asymmetric key cryptography, asymmetric key cryptography in batch, and symmetric key cryptography. Processing requests in a batch improves the efficiency of the system, as a large number of SMs communicate with the GW simultaneously for mutual authentication. The certificateless scheme in the proposed protocol maintains privacy preservation as the transmitted message is always encrypted over the network. Simulation results show that the authentication scenarios between the EP-SM, the SM-GW, and the SM-HA generate lower CMO and CPO in comparison with the existing protocols. Also, the overhead generated by our protocol are manageable, even when invalid requests exist in a batch. Through security analysis, we show that our protocol is secure against existing attacks, such as MITM attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks, redirection attacks, and floodbased DoS attacks. In sum, our protocol is lightweight with low execution time and efficiently provides a centrally integrated control in a decentralized environment. Furthermore, our protocol can be readily integrated with the cloud computing-based trusted entities to utilize powerful computing services of the cloud for efficiently managing the SG system.
